I don’t know, but I know that the odds were better than of Miner doing so.

“The Tigers failed to score more runs in the 8th and 9th too, so we couldn’t of won the game in a regulation 9 inning game anyway. It was extra innings at best if we played it your way.”

You’re analyzing it based on hindsight. Decisions should be evaluated based on the situation at the time — there was no way of knowing whether they will score 0, 1, 2 or more runs the rest of the game. You need to put yourself in the best position to based on the information you have. Yes, if the Tigers didn’t score the rest of the game they would have lost no matter how you look at it. But if they had come back and won by 10 runs, I’d still criticize the decision to use Miner (and the Everett fiasco) because it was wrong at the time.

Also, I don’t think it’s analogous to your poker bet because worst case, what are you losing? A couple guys having to pitch two days in a row?

The Tigers failed to score more runs in the 8th and 9th too, so we couldn’t of won the game in a regulation 9 inning game. It was extra innings at best if we played it your way. Then the pen was going to be depleted and we might not have a win to show for it. I don’t like that strategy at all. It reminds me of bad poker player who will bet most of his chips on a flush draw.

Miner isn’t that bad of a pitcher anyway.

I posted on this earlier in the thread – you need to use your best option in the highest leverage situations. If you burn through your bullpen to get a win, the worst case scenario is that some of them aren’t available the next day and you lose, but either way, you’re 1-1. On the other hand, there’s a very good chance many of them, if any, won’t be needed the next day anyway because the game might be a blowout. When you have a game where the outcome hangs in the balance in the 7th inning, you need to pull out all the stops. You don’t save guys just for the possibility that 1 or 2 days later you find yourself in the same situation, when that possibility isn’t guaranteed or even likely.

First, Seay is fully capable of throwing two days in a row, so even if Ni won’t be available the next day, Seay would be even if he pitched. Second, even if Seay wouldn’t be available, you don’t even know whether you’ll need a lefty the next game. See my post above – you don’t save people for future situations in a game that hangs in the balance and there’s a decent chance they won’t even be needed the next day.

“Question 1 – was there enough time to get Seay ready?”

At the point that they tied it up, maybe not. I think the real issue is Leyland was saving Seay for Ortiz/Drew the next time around, which is a reasonable move. If that’s the case, they need a 3rd lefty in the pen. If not, Seay could have been ready to pitch to Kotchman/Green/Ellsbury that inning.

“Question 2 – who is better, who is worse? Seay has been pitching bad lately. In 5 of his last 7 games he has given up runs.”

Seay is a far better bet than Miner vs. lefties, regardless of recent stats with small sample sizes.

“Question 3 – do you really want a lefty pitching when Bay is due up and he just hit a HR off of Ni in his last AB?”

This is a good point. It comes down to whether you want a lhp or rhp vs. Drew/Bay/Kotchman. You pick your poison bc you’re going to have a bad matchup for at least one of them. But even if you decide on a righty to pitch to Bay, Lyon or Rodney (and maybe Perry) is probably a better option (ignoring the discussion about “defined roles” earlier).

“Question 4 – Do you want to try to get 2 innings from this pitcher and save the bullpen?”

No. You don’t save the bullpen when you have a situation where the outcome of the game hangs in the balance in the 7th inning. See my post re: leverage above.

“If Seay was going to pitch, it’s was only going to be to one or two hitters. Then you’ll have to find somebody else to finish the 7th inning and pitch in the 8th inning.”

He would have been used through Ellsbury, which in all likelihood would have been the end of the 7th or 1 out in the 8th. Then you bring in Lyon for Pedroia/Youkilis.

I don’t really blame Leyland if he was saving Seay for Ortiz/Drew later, but that just shows why you need 3 lefties.

Perry hasn’t been effective his last couple games either.

I do agree that we need another lefty in the pen for situations like that.

Then Ni pitched 2 innings and gave up a run, now the score was 5-3, Boston with the lead at the end of 6 innings. At that time it sounded like to good move to get Miner warmed up and ready to pitch since we were losing by 2 runs. It would of been absolutely wrong to have Seay warming up at this time. One reason, is that we already used our other lefty in pen (Ni), who is surely going to be unavailable the next day because he just threw 49 pitches.
Fortunately, while Miner was getting ready to pitch in the top of the 7th inning the Tigers scored 2 runs and tied it up.
Question 1 – was there enough time to get Seay ready?
Question 2 – who is better, who is worse? Seay has been pitching bad lately. In 5 of his last 7 games he has given up runs.
Question 3 – do you really want a lefty pitching when Bay is due up and he just hit a HR off of Ni in his last AB?
Question 4 – Do you want to try to get 2 innings from this pitcher and save the bullpen?

IMO, with all those questions answered, Miner being the guy to pitch was the right call last night. If Seay was going to pitch, it’s was only going to be to one or two hitters. Then you’ll have to find somebody else to finish the 7th inning and pitch in the 8th inning. Miner did pitch a clean 8th inning BTW.

“You might be setting the team up to lose tomorrow if you throw your best relief pitchers Yesterday when you’re already not winning.”

Tomorrow might be a blowout. And the next 3 games might also be blowouts. It makes no sense to save your better options for tomorrow when there’s a decent chance you won’t need them. When you have a game that you have a 50% chance of winning in the 7th inning, that’s the highest leverage situation you may have for the next several days. All you would be doing is saving your guys just in case you encounter a similar situation the next day.

“You need to save those arms to preserve leads that can actually get you a win.”

This strategy maximizes the number of games in which you preserve a lead, but it minimizes the number of games you win after you’re behind or tied. That’s why a better basis for deciding who to use is the likelihood that the decision will affect the outcome, not simply whether you’re winning or losing.

“Also, each guy in the pen gets trained to pitch in a distinctive role.”

I agree, but it shouldn’t be that way. It didn’t use to be this way, so there’s no reason to think it needs to be. Managers have pigeonholed relievers into roles rather than giving them the opportunity to succeed in different situations. Rodney, for example, should be able to pitch while losing or tied, if the situation calls for it.

“It’s impossible to make the right calls every time when there is another manager on the opposite end making decisions to combat your very own.”

The fact that the other manager is combating your decisions means that the outcome won’t always be in your favor (that’s the way it goes in a game of hundreds of random events), but it doesn’t excuse not making the right call in the first place. If the other manager is going to combat, you also need to account for that (for example, if you know he’s going to respond with a move that puts you in a worse situation than you were in to begin with). But for example, you need to use Seay in that situation because the Red Sox lefty hitters are poor vs. LHP and they didn’t have many PH options. The problem is Leyland too often makes decisions that are clearly wrong at the time and turn out to be wrong. This isn’t a results-based analysis. If he were making the right decisions and due to chance they just happened to backfire, I wouldn’t complain.

Also, each guy in the pen gets trained to pitch in a distinctive role. In general, workers are just more productive when they learn through repetition. You just can’t pick up a book and learn how to pitch, or hit, or how to handle pressure, or how to manage a baseball team. You can only learn by repetition and experience. That’s just a plain simple fact.

It’s impossible to make the right calls every time when there is another manager on the opposite end making decisions to combat your very own. If a .500 team’s manager has 1000 critical decisions to make over the coarse of a season, probably only 500 of those decisions will be correct. As a fan watching the game, you’re only seeing those mistakes. The mistakes are easy to see and it’s easy for fans to get obsessed over them. That’s whats great about the game of baseball.